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INSURANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE
BY: JOSEPH MACDOUGALD AND PETER KOCHENBURGER'
I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change started as a scientific theory,
became the subject of environmental policy and
international negotiation, and today manifests itself
within the courts in a series of boundary testing cases
that challenge the settled concepts of risk and redress
available under both environmental and insurance law.
As our climate becomes increasingly unstable and the
causal link between damage from sea-level rise and
severe weather events becomes ever more tangible and
traceable, courts at all levels wrestle with varying
avenues of legal authority, including: the limitations of
legal redress through the political question doctrine2
the appropriateness of traditional federal and state
nuisance law,3 and the viability of addressing climate
change through established environmental statutory
apparatus, such as the Clean Air Act, which had
primarily regulated only traditional air pollution.4 By
2014, the first wave of climate law cases reached
resolution. Yet, through (or perhaps despite) this
process, clarity is emerging as it relates to an insured's
* Joseph MacDougald is a Professor in Residence and Executive Director for
the Center for Energy & Environmental Law, University of Connecticut School
of Law. Peter Kochenburger is an Associate Clinical Professor of Law and
Executive Director of the Insurance Law Center at UConn Law School. They
wish to thank the Center for Energy & Environmental Law's research
assistant, Amanda Bellmar, and Insurance Law Librarian Yan Hong for their
help.
2. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 879-80 (5th Cir. 2009)
(reversing a lower-court's decision that Comer's climate-based claims were
non-justiciable under the political question doctrine).
3. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011)
(holding that federal nuisance law has been displaced in favor of the
Environmental Protection Agencies' regulation of greenhouse gasses under the
Clean Air Act).
4. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); see also Transcript of Oral
Argument at 22, Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120) (Quoting
Justice Scalia: "But I always thought an air pollutant was something different
from a stratospheric pollutant, and your claim here is not that the pollution of
what we normally call "air" is endangering health. That isn't, that isn't-your
assertion is that after the pollutant leaves the air and goes up into the
stratosphere it is contributing to global warming.").
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liability for past emissions and insurer's obligations.
This paper will synthesize the developing field of
climate law with the insurance industry's practice and
policy. The first part of this paper will discuss the
evolving legal posture of climate liability law by
summarizing the long timescale of climate change's
awareness; reviewing a selection of the leading climate
liability cases involving emitters, specifically
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection AgencyG
and the recent modifying case of Utility Air Group v.
Environmental Protection Agency,7 Connecticut v.
American Electric Power,8 Native Village of Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil;p and finally assessing the impact of
climate change litigation on the insurer by presenting
the Supreme Court of Virginia case of AES v.
Steadfast.o
The second part of this paper examines the
insurance industry's response to this evolving legal
environment, drawing from policy and the diverse
public image presented by insurance companies as it
relates to this evolving risk category.
II. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
A. A Brief History of Climate Change Awareness and
Emissions
"A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a
significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two trends are related.
For when carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere, it acts like
the ceiling of a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the
escape of reflected heat. It is therefore a species-the most important
species-of a "greenhouse gas. 11
These words begin the Massachusetts v. EPA
opinion,12 the Supreme Court's most complete
statement on the law's response to greenhouse gas
5. For a treatment of the future of climate change litigation, including the
procedural histories of the cases mentioned in this article, see generally
Michael B. Gerrard & Joseph A. MacDougald, An Introduction to Climate
Change Liability and a View to the Future, 20 CONN. INS. L. J. 153 (2013)
(discussing emerging trends in climate change liability).
6. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
7 Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency,
573 U.S. 134 S.Ct. 2427 (2014).
8. 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
9. 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert denied 133 S.Ct. 2390 (2013).
10. 283 Va. 609 (2012).
11. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 504.
12. Id.
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(GHG) emissions and their effect on Earth's climate.
Justice Stevens' opening recognizes a relationship that
the scientific community has long understood: that
rising atmospheric carbon dioxide from anthropogenic
sources could have a significant, disruptive impact on
our climate. Scientists began wrestling with this fact
almost 200 years before the Massachusetts decision.
In the 1820s Joseph Fourier was troubled by a
simple thermodynamic calculation - the earth's warm
temperature could not be explained by the sun's daily
energy transferred to Earth and the subsequent
radiant heat loss back out to space.13 The explanation
behind this observation remained a mystery until
decades later, when John Tyndall discovered that
certain gasses might be transparent to visible light, but
relatively opaque (or insulating) as to infrared
radiation.14 Carbon dioxide is one of the greenhouse
gasses that serve as a barrier or insulator to heat. Yet a
full understanding of the greenhouse effect would wait
until just before the dawn of the twentieth century,
when Svante Arrhenius, a future Nobel Laureate,
would put the pieces together and correctly identify the
greenhouse effect.' Arrhenius explained the ice age by
drops in our atmosphere's concentration of greenhouses
gases' Looking into the future, Arrhenius hypothesized
that the Industrial Revolution's growing carbon dioxide
emissions from smokestacks would one day warm the
Earth.1 Arrhenius viewed this as potentially positive,
discussing expanded agriculture.18
The predicted build-up of atmospheric greenhouse
gasses only took on a menacing characteristic with the
multi-decade development of the now famous "Keeling
Curve." Scientist Charles David Keeling began
periodically sampling the atmosphere from an
observatory on the big island of Hawaii in the 1950's.19
His carefully controlled sampling revealed the
relentless upward staircase-climb of our global
13. SPENCER WEART, THE DIscOvERY OF GLOBAL WARMING 2-3 (2003).
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id. at 5-7.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 7. "Arrhenius, like nearly everyone at the end of the nineteenth
century, expected any technological change would be for the best."
19. Id. at 35. "[Keeling] set [a C02 measuring instrument] up atop the
volcanic peak Mauna Loa in Hawaii, surrounded by thousands of miles of
clean ocean, one of the best sites on Earth to measure the undisturbed
atmosphere."
201x] 103
The John Marshall Law Review
atmosphere's carbon-dioxide concentration.20 Keeling's
work, which began in the middle of the twentieth
century, visually demonstrates to policy makers that
they could watch the expanding carbon dioxide
concentration graph rise from 300 parts per million
("ppm"), to 350ppm, to now over 400ppm.21
The Keeling Curve
398.09 ppm
Carbon dioxide concentration at Mauna Loa Observatory
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22 As the phenomena of growing greenhouse gas
concentrations gained broader acceptance and study,
attention turned toward potentially catastrophic
consequences of a warming globe. Over fifty-five years
ago, in Frank Capra's short film, "Unchained
20. See David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty
of Care in Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1771 (2007)
(discussing tort litigation with respect to climate change issues); see generally
WEART, supra note 12 (tracing the development of global warming scientific
inquiry).
21. Justin Gillis, Heat-Trapping Gas Passes Milestone, Raising Fears, N.Y.
TIMES (May 10, 2013), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/11/science/eartb/carbon-dioxide-level-passes-
long-feared-milestone.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (stating, "'It symbolizes
that so far we have failed miserably in tackling this problem,' said Pieter P.
Tans, who runs the monitoring program at the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration that reported the new [400 ppm carbon dioxide
atmospheric concentration] reading.").
22. SCRIPPS INSTITUTION OF OCEANOCGRAPHY,http://keelingcurve.ucsd.edu
(last visited Feb 14, 2014).
104 [XX:ppp
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Goddess,"23 which is quaint by today's standards the
narrator warned that carbon dioxide emissions will
change our climate, melting the glaciers and causing
sea levels to rise.
Moving from entertainment and theorizing to
careful scientific review, studies such as the United
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
and other organizations have now documented the
complex and various possible negative consequences of
anthropogenic or "man-made" climate change.24 Such
consequences include sea level rise, more powerful
storms, dislocated weather patterns of excess snowfall
and drought, and human issues such as health effects
and the creation of climate refugees.25
It has been the path of our US litigation system
that there is a basis to seek relief when there is science
defining a harm, a potentially harmed class of victims,
and a traceable cause. This has significant
consequences for the insured and insurers alike.
B. The Rise of Climate Liability and Insurance
Litigation
Climate change litigation can arise in many
contexts.
Though climate related litigation exists in other countries, more
climate change cases have been brought in the United States than
in the rest of the world combined, and the United States stands
alone in seeing significant litigation that seeks to hold greenhouse
23. THE UNCHAINED GODDESS (Frank Capra Productions 1958).
24. See United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fifth
Assessment, Summary for policy makers,
http://www.ipce.ch/report/ar5/wgl/docs/WGIAR5_SPMbrochureen.pdf for
meteorological effects. See UN IPCC, Managing the Risks of Extreme Events
and Disasters to Advance Climate Adaptation, Summary for Policy Makers
92012), page 5 et seq. for a discussion of the health effects and mitigation
steps. http://www.ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/images/uploads/SREX-
SPMbrochure FINAL.pdf
25. See Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of
Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, 1, 2-10 (Thomas F. Stocker et. al eds., 2013),
available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/docs/WGIAR5_SPMbrochureen.pdf
(highlighting certain meteorological effects of global warming); see also United
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Managing the Risks of
Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Adaptation, Summary for
Policy Makers, 1, 5 et seq. (2012), available at http://www.ipc-
wg2.gov/SREX/images/uploads/SREX-SPMbrochure FINAL.pdf (discussing
health effects and possible mitigation steps).
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gas (GHG) emitters liable for the harms caused by climate change. 26
Environmental groups frequently challenge
governmental action through the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).27 Opponents to
climate change policy have used the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) and similar acts to require
climatologists, academics, and scientists, particularly
those attached to state universities or federal
departments, to turn over emails and other information
to public scrutiny.28 Similarly, environmental advocacy
groups have sought to compel the Environmental
Protection Agency to regulate on behalf of the
Endangered Species Act or the Clean Water Act.29
Of particular relevance for this discussion is the
line of cases that, taken together, discuss the role of the
Clean Air Act versus federal nuisance law as a vehicle
addressing climate change harm liability. Three cases,
spanning a time frame from 2007 until 2013, reveal the
Supreme Court's view of how climate liability is to be
assessed: Massachusetts v. EPA,30 (as modified by
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA in June 2014),
Connecticut v. American Electric Power,31 and Native
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil.32 Of particular
importance here is the case whose final disposition is
the most recent: Kivalina v. ExxonMobil. The Kivalina
26. Gerrard, supra note 5, at 153. Specifically, COLUMBIA LAw SCH.
CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE, http://web.1aw.columbia.edulclimate-
change/resources/non-us-climate-change-litigation-chart (last visited Mar. 28,
2014) (providing multiple charts describing non-U.S. climate litigation).
RICHARD LORD, ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY: TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
27. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biodiversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1200 (stating,
"NHTSA's reasoning is arbitrary and capricious for several reasons. First,
while the record shows that there is a range of values, the value of carbon
emissions reduction is certainly not zero. NHTSA conceded as much during
oral argument when, in response to questioning, counsel for NHTSA admitted
that the range of values begins at $3 per ton carbon. NHTSA insisted at
argument that it placed no value on carbon emissions reduction rather than
zero value. We fail to see the difference.").
28. See Cuccinelli v. Univ. of Va., 283 Va. 4210 (2012) (holding Virginia
Attorney General's Civil Investigative Demand for information was not
applicable to the University); see also Am. Trad. Inst. v. Univ. of Va., 130934
Va. 1 (2014) (employing FOIA in a companion case before the Virginia
Supreme Court).
29. Letter from the Center for Biological Diversity to the EPA (July 23,
2013), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ogc/NOIdocuments/NoticeEPAWAOR303d2013.pdf
(providing an example of one such attempt to compel the EPA to act).
30. See generally Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497.
31. See generally Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. 2527.
32. See generally Kivalina, 696 F.3d 849.
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case led to a dispute, ultimately resolved by the
Supreme Court of Virginia, between an insured and the
insurer regarding whether the harm alleged by the
Inupiat tribe in the Native Village of Kivalina was the
type appropriately covered by a Commercial General
Liability (CGL) Policy.33
1. Massachusetts v. EPA
Massachusetts v. EPA is the seminal case for
climate law and the Clean Air Act (CAA). Brought on
behalf of several states and other interested parties,
the case sought to compel the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate carbon dioxide
from mobile sources as a pollutant within the meaning
of the CAA. The EPA argued that it did not have
authority to regulate due to many considerations,
including the Bush Administration's negotiations with
developing countries.34
Justice Stevens noted in the opinion that "EPA
does not dispute the existence of a causal connection
between man-made greenhouse gas emissions and
global warming. At a minimum, therefore, EPA's
refusal to regulate such emissions 'contributes' to
Massachusetts' injuries." These injuries included loss
of shoreline.
EPA no doubt has significant latitude as to the manner, timing,
content, and coordination of its regulations with those of other
agencies. But once EPA has responded to a petition for rulemaking,
its reasons for action or inaction must conform to the authorizing
statute. Under the clear terms of the Clean Air Act, EPA can avoid
taking further action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do
not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable
explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to
determine whether they do.3 6
The Court ultimately endorsed the CAA as being
responsive to greenhouse gasses. 37 Subsequent to this
ruling, the EPA made an endangerment finding under
33. This Article will discuss the liability and insurance implications of
these cases. See generally Gerrard, supra note 5 (providing a more detailed
case summary as well as additional procedural insight).
34. See Gerrard, supra note 5, at 155 (stating "The Agency's rationale was
based on several considerations, including, among others, the assertion that
since GHG emissions were the subject of international negotiations by the
Executive Branch, regulatory development by the EPA would disrupt these
delicate, international proceedings.").
35. Mass v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 523.
36. Id. at 533.
37. Id.
107201x]
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the CAA; specifically the EPA found that carbon
dioxide is a danger to the public health and welfare,
making carbon dioxide a regulated pollutant under the
CAA's authority to regulate mobile sources and, by
extension, stationary sources.38 While many other cases
involving climate claims had been dismissed under the
political question doctrine or on other grounds,
indicating the courts were choosing not to engage in the
climate change debate, Massachusetts v. EPA
suggested that judicial rulings by the US Supreme
Court were possible.
In July 2014, the Supreme Court revisited and
clarified the Mass v. EPA holding in the case of Utility
Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection
Agency 39 . In implementing the Mass v. EPA decision,
the EPA reasoned that if greenhouse gasses are "air
pollutants" under the mobile sources portion of the
Clean Air Act, then the Court's decision must "trigger"
an obligation to regulate greenhouse gasses under the
stationary sources portion of the Clean Air Act.41
Trying to avoid massively expanding the reach of Clean
Air Act's regulated base, the EPA issued a "tailoring
rule" to increase the limits of GHG emissions that
would require clean air act compliance. 42
In a holding that was considered by many to be a
vindication of EPA's regulatory approach, 43 the Court,
in a 7-2 ruling, upheld the EPA's regulation of
38. See generally Patricia Ross McCubbin, EPA's Endangerment Finding
for Greenhouse Gases and the Potential Duty to Adopt National Ambient Air
Quality Standards to Address Global Climate Change, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 437
(2009).
39 Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency, 573 US
- 134 S.Ct. 2427 (2014)(hereinafter "JARG")
41 Id. at EPA issued its "final decision" regarding the prospect that motor-
vehicle greenhouse-gas standards would trigger stationary-source permitting
requirements ... .(hereinafter Triggering Rule).
42 Id. "EPA announced that beginning on the effective date of its greenhouse-
gas standards for motor vehicles, stationary sources would be subject to the
PSD program and Title V on the basis of their potential to emit greenhouse
gases. . . . EPA then announced steps it was taking to "tailor" the PSD
program and Title V to greenhouse gases. . . . Those steps were necessary, it
said, because the PSD program and Title V were designed to regulate "a
relatively small number of large industrial sources," and requiring permits for
all sources with greenhouse-gas emissions above the statutory thresholds
would radically expand those programs, making them both unadministrable
and "unrecognizable to the Congress that designed" them."
43 See Adam Liptak, Justices Uphold Emissions Limits on Big Industry, N.Y.
Times. June 23, 2014,. 'In a big win for environmentalists, the Supreme Court
on Monday effectively endorsed the Obama administration's efforts to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions fronm sources like power plants, even as it criticized
what it called the administration's overreaching."
108 [XX:ppp
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greenhouse gasses from those sources whose control
technologies were already being regulated for other
reasons under the Clean Air Act, so called "anyway
sources," but in a portion of the decision that divided 5-
4, the Court held that a stationary source could not be
regulated solely due to its greenhouse gas emissions.44
Having dispatched this fundamental challenge to
the Mass v. EPA rationale, the Court confirmed that
the Clean Air Act exists as a primary vehicle to address
climate change. However, at the time of the Mass
ruling, several questions remained unanswered as to
whether or not the Clean Air Act was the exclusive
path at law to for the injured to seek redress from or to
change the behavior of greenhouse gas emitters.
2. Connecticut v. AEP
Following Massachusetts v. EPA, the collection of
states comprising the plaintiffs in Connecticut v. AEP
argued that while as a statutory scheme, the CAA may
exist to address greenhouse gases, principles of federal
nuisance law could allow a collection of states to seek
injunctive relief against the emitters. The states that
brought the action believed that while EPA may have
the ability to regulate under the CAA and issue an
endangerment finding, that until EPA actually
regulates, the injunctive power of federal common law
nuisance was still available to them.45 The Court,
having just supported the CAA as their regulatory
vehicle for addressing greenhouse gas emissions, was
not eager to open up an entire new enforcement regime
in the judiciary through federal nuisance law. "The
plaintiffs argue, as the Second Circuit held, that federal
common law is not displaced until EPA actually
44. Id. at 2449. "We hold that EPA exceeded its statutory authority when it
interpreted the Clean Air Act to require PSD and Title V permitting for
stationary sources based on their greenhouse-gas emissions. Specifically, the
Agency may not treat greenhouse gases as a pollutant for purposes of defining
a "major emitting facility" (or a "modification" thereof) in the PSD context or a
"major source" in the Title V context. To the extent its regulations purport to
do so, they are invalid. EPA may, however, continue to treat greenhouse gases
as a "pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter" for purposes of
requiring BACT for "anyway" sources. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed in part and reversed in part."
45. See Gerrard, supra note 5, at 159. "As Connecticut had been the only
GHG nuisance law case to be decided by the Supreme Court, and in that case
plaintiffs sought only injunctive relief, the Kivalina plaintiffs hoped their case
was distinguishable since it claimed money damages instead."
201x] 109
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exercises its regulatory authority, i.e., until it sets
standards governing emissions from the defendants'
plants. We disagree."46 Noting that Congress created
the CAA with a purposeful and deliberative decision-
making path before regulating a pollutant, the
unanimous Court held:
Indeed, this prescribed order of decision making-the first decider
under the Act is the expert administrative agency, the second,
federal judges-is yet another reason to resist setting emissions
standards by judicial decree under federal tort law. The appropriate
amount of regulation in any particular greenhouse gas-producing
sector cannot be prescribed in a vacuum: as with other questions of
national or international policy, informed assessment of competing
interests is required. Along with the environmental benefit
potentially achievable, our Nation's energy needs and the possibility
of economic disruption must weigh in the balance. 47
This 2011 decision dismissing the complaint held
that the regulation of greenhouse gasses was in the
hands of the EPA, reinforcing Massachusetts v. EPA.48
3. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil
Corpora tion
Kivalina is an Alaskan village occupying some four
square miles on the tip of a barrier island and is largely
populated by the federally recognized tribe of Inupiat
Native Alaskans.
Kivalina's survival has been threatened by erosion resulting from
wave action and sea storms for several decades . . . The villagers of
Kivalina depend on the sea ice that forms on their coastline in the
fall, winter, and spring each year to shield them from powerful
coastal storms. But in recent years, the sea ice has formed later in
the year, attached later than usual, broken up earlier than expected,
and has been thinner and less extensive in nature. As a result,
Kivalina has been heavily impacted by storm waves and surges that
are destroying the land where it sits. Massive erosion and the
possibility of future storms threaten buildings and critical
infrastructure in the city with imminent devastation. If the village
is not relocated, it may soon cease to exist. [In its lawsuit], Kivalina
attributes the impending destruction of its land to the effects of
global warming, which it alleges results in part from emissions of
large quantities of greenhouse gases by the Energy Producers. 49
Kivalina sued numerous emitters of greenhouse
gasses including the AES Corporation, an owner-
46. Conn. v. AEP, 131 S.Ct. at 2538.
47. Id. at 2539.
48. Id.
49. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobile Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th
Cir. 2012).
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operator of many energy businesses including power
generation from coal-fired power plants.50 The lawsuit
asked for monetary damages to relocate the native
population. The Army Corps of Engineers had
recommended evacuation and indicated the expense
would be substantial.51 Unlike in Connecticut, where
the plaintiff state sought injunctive relief, the Kivalina
plaintiffs sought only monetary damages. "As
Connecticut had been the only GHG nuisance law case
to be decided by the Supreme Court, and in that case
plaintiffs sought only injunctive relief, the Kivalina
plaintiffs hoped their case was distinguishable since it
claimed money damages instead."52 The Ninth Circuit,
however, dismissed the case on the grounds that, "the
Supreme Court has held that federal common law
addressing domestic greenhouse gas emissions has
been displaced by Congressional action. That
determination displaces federal common law public
nuisance actions seeking damages, as well as those
actions seeking injunctive relief." The Supreme Court
denied certiorari in May 2013.54
Combined, these three cases demonstrate the
Court's clear direction that the liability and regulation
of GHGs is directed through the CAA, displacing
federal common law claims.
C. AES v. Steadfast - First Impressions of Climate
Law and Liability Insurance.
While the question of ultimate liability and
regulation were being resolved in the federal courts,
another climate case was making its way through the
Virginia state court system. As discussed supra, the
50. See AES Annual Report, 1, 14 (2012), available at
http://investor.aes.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=76149&p=irol-
reportsAnnualArchive#2012 (stating, "[w]e currently own andlor operate a
generation portfolio of approximately 31,000 MW, excluding the generation
capabilities of our integrated utilities. Our generation fleet is diversified by
fuel type. As a percentage of installed capacity, coal and natural gas each
account for 36% and 35%, respectively, of our generating capacity.
Renewables, primarily hydro, wind and solar, represent 25% of our generating
capacity and oil, diesel and petroleum coke comprise the rest.").
51. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Alaska Village Erosion Technical
Assistance Program, 1, 4-5, 23 (2006),
http://www.housemajority.org/coms/clilAVETAReport.pdf.
52. Gerrard, supra note 5, at 159 (citations omitted).
53. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858.
54. See UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, ORDER LIST: 569 U.S. 1 (2013),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/052013zor-m6io.pdf (denying
certiorari without the participation of Justice Alito).
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Kivalina plaintiffs had sought recovery from the AES
Corporation as one of the Energy Providers. When
sued, AES notified Steadfast Insurance Company, who
had provided Commercial General Liability (CGL)
insurance for several years during the period Kivalina
was alleging that AES harmed them through GHG
emissions. Steadfast filed a declaratory judgment
action, stating that they did not owe a defense to AES
for three reasons:
"(1) the Complaint did not allege 'property damage' caused by an
'occurrence,' which was necessary for there to be coverage under the
policies; (2) any alleged injury arose prior to the inception of
Steadfast's coverage; and (3) the claims alleged in the Complaint fell
within the scope of the pollution exclusion stated in AES's
policies." 55
The Supreme Court of Virginia applied its
traditional "eight corners rule" to determine whether
Steadfast had a duty to defend AES in the Kivalina
litigation. The court stated:
Both AES and Steadfast agree that it is a well-established principle,
consistently applied in this Commonwealth, that only the
allegations in the complaint and the provisions of the insurance
policy are to be considered in deciding whether there is a duty on
the part of the insurer to defend and indemnify the insured. This
principle is commonly known as the "eight corners rule" because the
determination is made by comparing the "four corners" of the
underlying complaint with the "four corners" of the policy, to
determine whether the allegations in the underlying complaint come
within the coverage provided by the policy. 56
Steadfast asserted three coverage defenses, though
the Virginia Supreme Court focused on only one,
whether the consequences of emitting GHG's were an
"occurrence" under the policies. For coverage to be
triggered, the occurrence could not have been a
foreseeable consequence of GHG emissions, but instead
an accident or unintended consequence. In their
analysis of the policies, the Virginia Supreme Court
stated:
[t]he relevant policies provide coverage for damage resulting from
an "occurrence," and define an occurrence as "an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general
harmful condition." The terms "occurrence" and "accident" are
"synonymous and ... refer to an incident that was unexpected from
the viewpoint of the insured." [The Virginia Supreme Court had
previously] held that an "accident" is commonly understood to mean
55. AES v. Steadfast Ins. Corp., 725 S.E.2d 532, 533 (Va. 2012).
56. Id. at 535 (citations omitted).
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"an event which creates an effect which is not the natural or
probable consequence of the means employed and is not intended,
designed, or reasonably anticipated." An accidental injury is one
that "happen[s] by chance, or unexpectedly; taking place not
according to the usual course of things; casual; fortuitous."5
The Virginia court noted that when the action was
intentional but the consequences were accidental then,
"the dispositive issue in determining whether an
accidental injury occurred is not whether the action
undertaken by the insured was intended, but rather
whether the resulting harm is alleged to have been
reasonably anticipated or the natural or probable
consequence of the insured's intentional act."58 Thus,
insurance coverage turned on one question: could the
climate change consequences of GHG emissions have
been reasonably anticipated by AES?
To solve this problem, the Virginia court did not
need to look at the long history of climate change
science, although Kivalina brought its lawsuit against
the backdrop of the scientific background mentioned at
the beginning of this article. Instead, adhering to its
"eight corners" analysis, the Virginia Supreme Court
noted that the entire Kivalina allegation was for
intentional harm, and AES knew or should have known
of the consequences of its emissions. Specifically:
Where the harmful consequences of an act are alleged to have been
not just possible, but the natural or probable consequences of an
intentional act, choosing to perform the act deliberately, even if in
ignorance of that fact, does not make the resulting injury an
"accident" even when the complaint alleges that such action was
negligent. . . . Even if AES were actually ignorant of the effect of its
actions and/or did not intend for such damages to occur, Kivalina
alleges its damages were the natural and probable consequence of
AES's intentional actions. Therefore, Kivalina does not allege that
its property damage was the result of a fortuitous event or accident,
and such loss is not covered under the relevant CGL policies.59
AES v. Steadfast is the only state supreme court
decision directly applying climate change claims to a
liability policy.60 However, it may have little
precedential power. The decision is based on a
constricted view of "occurrence" and "accident" that, as
the concurrence notes, could eliminate coverage for
garden-variety negligence claims6i and may not be
57. Id. at 536 (citations omitted).
58. Id. (citations omitted, emphasis from the original).
59. Id. at 538 (citations omitted).
60. AES, 725 S.E.2d at 532.
61. Id. at 538-539. Interpretation of an insurance contract is a matter of
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adopted by other courts considering climate change
liability. Perhaps more importantly, the court did not
need to evaluate the pollution exclusions in the policies,
which could provide firmer and more widely accepted
grounds for excluding such claims.62 Finally, liability
insurers can also modify their policy language to
specifically exclude liability against policyholders
arising from climate change claims, though state
insurance regulators typically have the authority to
review new policy forms and endorsements and
perhaps to exclude their use.
For now, some questions appear answered in the
evolving field of climate law. Now thrice-reinforced, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that Congress
intended the CAA's statutory scheme to be the legal
source to address climate change. Barring
Congressional action, emitters are unlikely to be
subject to liability or injunctive relief under federal law
outside of the CAA. However, other regulatory
approaches are being constantly urged upon the
judiciary and the EPA through the CAA, the
Endangered Species Act, and others. None of these
alternatives have faced any substantial court
challenge.
Climate change is complex. There are many effects,
some of which could lead to claims that are viable
under state law. Kivalina was concerned with sea level
rise,63 but what of claims for drought, shellfish
population decimation, or enhanced storms? These
scientific areas may not have been as predictable
several years ago, a fact that could affect both liability
for damages and the applicability of insurance coverage
for such claims. Our weather systems are complex and
so are the unintended and unforeseen consequences of
changing a planet's climate. New information appears
to emerge almost daily.
state law and there can be significant variation in how state courts address
similar insurance policy language. Id.
62 Steadfast's appeal brief cites this pollution exclusion: "[this policy does not apply to
damages] arising out of the actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or
escape of 'pollutants.' "Pollutants" are "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste."
(record citations deleted). The AES Corporation, Appellant, v. Steadfast Insurance
Company, Appellee., 2010 WL 6893536 (Va.), 5-6.
63. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 849.
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III. INSURERS & CLIMATE CHANGE
A. Why Insurers are Involved
Insurance companies are engaged with climate
change as corporate actors, as investors, and as
insurers of risks. Insurers own and rent large amounts
of real -estate, and for those operating nationally and
internationally, branches throughout the country and
world. As landlords and tenants, insurers are subject to
most types of weather and climate related risks,
including hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes,
blizzards, hail, and of course floods. The industry
employs millions, purchases and consumes energy, and
holds itself out as a "green" actor.64 Whether organized
as a stock company or a mutual owned (theoretically)
by its policyholders, insurers are corporations also
responsible to their stockholders, policyholders,
reinsurers, private rating agencies, as well as
government regulators in every jurisdiction they do
business in. Insurers collect vast sums of money from
premiums that must be reserved and conservatively
invested so that the promise of insurance, paying
claims lawfully owed, is upheld even when those claims
come due years and sometimes many decades after the
policy was issued. Insurers are major investors in
government bonds, stocks and real estate generally65
and this role provides both opportunities to influence
development to adapt to climate change, as well as
financial risks for failing to do so.
However, it is insurers' business in underwriting
risks that places them in a different role than most
other corporate actors. Companies insure commercial
and residential properties near oceans and rivers, on
earthquake fault lines, and in areas subject to all forms
of weather-related risks.6 While property insurance
may pose the greatest underwriting risk, liability
64. See, e.g., websites for Allstate, USAA, and The Hartford, infra notes
55-63.
65. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, A Firm Foundation: How
Insurance Support the Economy, available at http://www2.iii.org/firm-
foundationlintroduction/to-the-reader.html (describing that in 2012 the
insurance industry held $7 trillion in invested assets and cash; the majority of
investments was held in bonds, with government-related bonds the majority of
the bond portfolio).
66. However, not all potentially catastrophic events are natural. Chemical,
nuclear and biological hazards are risks that are not necessarily insurable,
and insuring against acts of terrorism has required a government role to
maintain a private insurance market. See, e.g., Terrorism Risk Insurance
Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-160, 121 Stat 1839.
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insurance, life and health insurance and workers'
compensation can also be affected by climate change.
Insurers utilize historical loss patterns and weather
modeling to help set rates (premiums).67 Climate
change challenges these calculations by both increasing
the number and severity of weather-related losses and
by adding considerable uncertainty as to where and
how these losses will develop. Insurers theoretically
have the tools to manage some of this uncertainty, but
scientific, regulatory and market constraints also limit
their abilities to do so.
The insurance industry's economic interests and
capabilities can enable it to contribute to climate
change adaption in several important ways. First, as
well-funded private actors, insurers can participate in
research on mitigation strategies (e.g., hurricane-
resistant buildings),68 educate their policyholders and
the public generally, and as part of their extensive
lobbying activities, advocate at the state, federal and
international levels public for adaption policies such as
up-to-date building codes and environmental and
zoning laws limiting building in particularly sensitive
areas. Insurers do this now, though with significant
variations in how they present to the public.69
As underwriters, insurers assess, categorize and
price risk for policyholders. Their decisions on whether
to insure, and if so at what price and with what
limitations, provide powerful economic incentives for
policyholders to modify their actions in socially
desirable ways.70  For example, a property insurer
might increase or decrease a premium based on the
building design and materials used to construct it (e.g.,
if it incorporate the latest in hurricane and wind-
resistant roofing, windows and doors), its proximity to
flood waters, and the existence and sophistication of its
emergency management and business interruption
planning.71 Or, an insurer might refuse to insure a
67. See, e.g., CHRISTINA M. CARROLL, ET AL. CLIMATE CHANGE
AND INSURANCE, 135-137 (2012).
68. See, e.g., THE INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR BUSINESS AND HOME SAFETY,
https://www.disastersafety.org/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
69. See infra Section II C (discussing such variations).
70. See, e.g., Tom Baker and Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability
Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV.
1412, 1416-27 (2013) (explaining there is a large volume of literature from
multiple disciplines on the role of insurance as a "private regulator"); Richard
V. Ericson, Aaron Doyle & Dean Barry, INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE, Ch. 2
(2003).
71. Standard commercial property insurance covers "business
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structure altogether, because of its location, inadequate
construction, or repeated loss history. In some
instances, the private market's refusal to insure
specific risks or industries can mean the creation of a
government-sponsored insurance program, such as a
state windstorm program72 or the federal National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).73
B. Insurance and Public Policy
Insurers' flexibility is limited not only by
competitive pressures and scientific uncertainty, but
also by operating in a complex regulatory environment
that can inhibit their ability to utilize risk-based
pricing with insureds who are susceptible to weather
events and the effects of climate change. States, rather
than the federal government, regulate most areas of
property, casualty, and life insurance.74 Individual
states have great latitude in regulating insurance
rates, the types and forms of coverage, and insurers'
relationships with their policyholders, including
interruption" losses as well as the costs of repairing or replacing physical
structures. Business interruption insurance covers continuing expenses that
must be paid despite the temporary cessation of business, as well as net profit.
This coverage can be the largest source of insurer claim payments when the
physical damage is largely to commercial rather than residential structures.
See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE AND INSURANCE, supra note 59, at 137.
72. See, e.g., CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION,
https://www.citizensfla.com/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 30, 2014) (indicating
that Florida's Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, serves as a residual
market for a large number of residential properties).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 4001, et. seq. (2012). The NFIP is within the Department
of Homeland Security and under the Federal Emergency Management Agency
("FEMA"). Government-sponsored insurance programs may serve as the
primary insurer of a specific risk (e.g., flood coverage for residential and small
business properties), or as a supplement or reinsurer to the private insurance
market (e.g., the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 41). Id.
74. While the federal government has had clear Constitutional authority to
regulate insurance since 1944 (See U.S. v. S.E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S.
533, 552-53 (1944) (defining insurance as interstate commerce), it has
specifically declined to exercise this authority in most areas of insurance. See
15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012) (stating in the preamble of the 1945 McCarran-
Ferguson Act that state insurance regulation "is in the public interest."). The
U.S. is one of the few nations in the world with a mature insurance market
that regulates insurance primarily at the regional rather than federal level.
This regulatory structure (or lack thereof) creates both challenges and
opportunities for insurers in addressing climate change issues. See, e.g.,
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW AND
REGULATION, 226-227, 656-661 (Edward Elger, 2011); Chapter 10; Susan
Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism
and the national Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLORIDA ST. U.
L. REV. 625 (1999).
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limitations on canceling or non-renewing policies.75
Insurance is also not only a desirable product for
property owners; it is often a prerequisite, as lenders
require property insurance on mortgaged properties
throughout the loan period.76 Public and political
pressure may cause insurance regulators to limit rates
where insurance is required, such as in homeowners,
auto, and workers' compensation lines.77 Catastrophic
events often brings these pressures to the forefront, as
happened after Hurricanes Katrina (2005) and Sandy
(2012); with political and regulatory struggles as
insurers attempted to raise rates and limit exposure to
hurricane-prone properties, and property owners
fighting to keep insurance affordable.
Regardless of the wisdom of regulating the rates
and terms of an insurance contract, doing so often
limits or eliminates the benefits of risk-based pricing. If
insurers cannot charge an actuarially accurate
premium for a home located on the Gulf Coast, or the
New Jersey shore, then the policyholder is not bearing
the full insurance cost of the risk.78 This allows the
policyholder to make decisions, such as where to locate
property, which costs are partially paid for by others,79
75. The degree of rate and form regulation varies by state, though personal
lines insurance (homeowner and auto) is more regulated than commercial
lines, including commercial property. See supra note 61.
76. In addition to insuring property, insurance acts a gatekeeper for
individuals and companies desiring to engage in a variety of activities,
including driving, operating a business (workers' compensation and now
health insurance), engaging in certain professions (states often require
liability insurance for doctors, lawyers, insurance agents, and other
occupations). Thus its description or term as a "private regulator."
77. G.A.O., National Disasters: Public Policy Options for Changing the
Federal Role in Natural Catastrophe Insurance, 11-14 (GAO-08-07, November
2007). Rate regulation - or "suppression" - is not necessarily inappropriate, as
the decisions on insurance access and affordability can determine who can own
property and where, who can drive, or provide for their families in the event of
death or disability. Regulating rates and risk classifications allows
government the option of subsidizing premiums to the benefit of one risk class,
and possible detriment to others, and to determine what risks should be borne
by society as a whole. These are or should be political (public policy) decisions
and not determined solely by market forces.
78. Howard C. Kunreuther and Erwann 0. Michel-Kerjan, AT WAR WITH
THE WEATHER, 25-27 (2009). What is an "actuarially accurate premium" is
itself often an area of dispute between insurers and policyholders, with
regulators authorized in many states to determine the appropriate rate
(subject to appeal to the courts). The growing complexity and sophistication of
risk modeling poses major challenges for regulators who may not have full
access to the models, or the technical staff to evaluate them. This is a topic
needing greater attention, but not in this paper.
79. Id. And, since insurers spread risk and losses over the long term rather
than absorbing them, it is other policyholders rather than the insurance
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and can encourage more development in risk-prone
areas than a full risk-based premium would. The
political and legal debate surrounding the 2012
amendments to the federal National Flood Insurance
Program8o that attempted to eliminate subsidized rates
for residences and small businesses, and the March
2014 legislation that- partially repealed them,8 1
demonstrates the challenges of allowing risk-based
premiums to fully operate.82 The cost of insurance can
be a powerful incentive in directing private economic
decisions that can aid in climate change adaptation and
mitigation, such as how and where to build. Legal
restrictions on insurance rates may reflect an explicit
public policy determination to spread certain risks, but
also should be viewed as an obstacle to utilizing
insurance as a private regulatory tool to mitigate some
of the effects of climate change.
C. Climate Change and Insurers' Public Face
Insurers have ample reason to closely follow
climate change science and predictions for increased
flooding, storms and other weather-related events.
However, how individual insurers publicly
communicate their awareness of climate change varies
greatly. These differences may reflect a company's
estimation of how climate change may alter its
business, or the company's perception of how its
customers (policyholders and potential policyholders)
consider the issue.
The authors have reviewed the websites of various
property casualty insurers over a one-year period,
selecting the largest personal lines carriers in the
United States as well as several insurers who have
major commercial lines operations, including
industry who subsidizes these property owners.
80. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
141, Div. F, Title II, Subtitle A, § 100201, 126 Stat. 916 (2012) ["Biggert
Waters"].
81
See note [112], infra.
82. A subsidized national flood insurance program is not by definition a
bad choice, if our public policy is to spread the risk of flood loss throughout the
country, including taxpayers who have no realistic flood exposure. We have
made similar choices in other areas, such as the federal terrorism reinsurance
program or in the Affordable Care Act by eliminating health insurers' ability
to utilize pre-existing conditions in rate-setting, thereby subsidizing
individuals with expensive medical conditions. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act,
supra note 41; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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commercial property insurance.83 As a comparison, four
large reinsurers, three in Europe and one in the United
States, were also examined.84 This is not intended as
comprehensive study, which could include more
insurers, other regions (and languages) reviewing
websites over a multi-year period, and examining other
documents that insurers produce as part of their
"public face."85
There are significant differences in how these
companies present their public positions on climate
change among insurers in the United States, as well as
overall differences between US companies and
European reinsures. Figures 1-5 provide examples of
the search results for five companies. 86
Figure 1: Swiss Re 8 7
"Managing climate and natural disaster risk
Re/insurance plays an important role in managing climate and
natural disaster risk, and that's why it's part of Swiss Re's core
business."
83. This list includes Allstate, American Family, CNA, Farmers, GEICO,
The Hartford, Liberty Mutual, Nationwide, Progressive, Travelers, State Farm
and USAA.
84. Swiss Re, Hannover Re, Munich Re, and Gen Re (a Berkshire
Hathaway company based in New York).
85. Though a company's website and the issues it decides to emphasize on
it are likely to be the best example of its public messaging outside of direct
insurance product marketing, some U.S. insurers with minimal web-based
discussion of climate change do report on the issue in their annual reports
filed with regulators..
86. "Climate change" was the initial search term utilized on every insurer
website. If no results came up additional search terms, such as "global
warming," would be used. On all websites, we also reviewed various company




visited Apr. 4, 2014).
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Figure 2: Munich Re8 8
LIMATE CHANGE'(
Figure 3: State Farm"9
You Searched For
climate change
1 - 2 of 2 | Showing:
Tips for Avoiding Tractor-Trailer
Accidents Safety Learning Center
State Farm
... truck driver can see you and knows your intention. Don't change
lanes abruptly. Any sudden motion in a truck driver's periphery ...
visual indicator of your intentions. Adjust driving speed to climate
conditions. Rain, snow, and high winds can make driving ...
88. MUNICH RE,
http://wiAww.munichre.com/en/group/focus/climate change/default.aspx (last
visited Apr. 4, 2014).
89. STATE FARM,
https://sfesearch.statefarm.com/Gateway/QueryService.aspx?view=statefarmeo
msppublished&query=climate change&original=climate change (last visited
Apr. 4, 2014).
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Figure 4: Nationwide9 0
climate char Search
1 - 1 of 1 results for climate change.
Disaster Preparedness Read About
Disaster ManagerrLent and ...
ww3. nationwide. com,/catas1rophe-
c enter.sp
Find how disaster preparedness may help keep you and your family
safe.




Travelers9 l Climate & the
Travelers is one of the largest providers of property casualty
insurance products in the United States. Our success is built upon
our ability to provide innovative insurance and risk protection
products and services tailored to our customers' needs. We are
continually monitoring, anticipating and reacting to changing
climate conditions across all of our operations.
European reinsurers utilize their websites as a
forum for climate change information far more than
90. NATIONWIDE, http://www.nationwide.com/search/query.htm (last
visited Apr. 4, 2014).
91. TRAVELERS, https://www.travelers.com/about-us/travelers-
institute/thought-leadership/climate-and-environment.aspx (last visited Apr.
4, 2014).
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any US insurer. The thoroughness with which this
material is discussed may indicate that these
companies believe that an extensive public dialogue on
climate change, including how they are addressing it, is
a marketing or promotional advantage, reflecting the
view that responsible insurers and reinsurers should
confront climate change and help their policyholders do
so as well.92
These insurers' public acceptance of climate change
contrasts dramatically to the reticence of many major
U.S. property-casualty insurers in the United States to
publicly address the issue. State Farm is the most
notable example. Figure 3 is the result of the most
recent search conducted on State Farm's website; there
is virtually no public information provided on climate
change or adaptation, nor have repeated searches over
the last year discovered any.9 3  State Farm is the
largest personal lines property-casualty insurer in the
country, operates in most states, and has millions of
policyholders potentially exposed to climate change-
related losses.94
This is also true for other property casualty
insurers in the United States, including American
Family, GEICO, Liberty Mutual, Nationwide and
USAA. In contrast, several large commercial lines
insurers who also have significant personal lines
operations, are more descriptive or public about their
views toward climate change, including The Hartford
and Travelers. These differences among U.S. insurers
might reflect a split between stock and mutual
companies; American Family, Nationwide and State
Farm are mutual companies, whereas The Hartford
and Travelers are stock companies. Since there is still
significant doubt in the American public about climate
change, mutual insurers might be more reluctant to
92. This does not imply that insurers' concern is a facade; as noted,
insurers have very good reasons to participate in the climate change debate
and to research and promote adaptation strategies. There is also some
variation among the three European reinsurers; Hannover Re provides
extensive information on various environmental initiatives, but does not
prominently reference "climate change" - at least not on their English
language webpages. HANNOVER RE, http://www.hannover-re.com (last visited
Apr. 4, 2014).
93. See State Farm, supra note 62.
94. Based on 2012 data, State Farm was the largest homeowner insurer in
the U.S., with approximately 20.74% of the market, as well as the leading
property casualty insurer with 10.3% of the overall property casualty market,
based on direction written premiums. INSURANCE INFORMATION
INSTITUTE FACT BOOK, 96, 15 (2014).
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publicly engage in the debate. In contrast, stock
companies are owned by sophisticated investors more
likely to believe in the reality of climate change, and
perhaps expect insurers to address it directly. This is
speculation however and there are contrary examples.
CNA is a large commercial stock insurer with no
personal lines operations, yet it has virtually no
information on climate change on its website.95
Progressive is a personal lines stock company and
similarly has no climate change information on its
website.96
That reinsurers have a significantly greater public
(website) focus on climate change than do property-
casualty direct insurers,97 could suggest that the
reinsurance industry is simply more exposed and
therefore more concerned over the potential effects of
climate change. Additionally, reinsurance has
historically been a global business. Swiss Re, Munich
Re and Hannover Re reinsure risks throughout the
world that are potentially subject to every weather
pattern that climate change could worsen.98 However,
large property-casualty insurers, at least in the U.S.,
have similar reasons to be concerned about climate
change and increased losses among its policyholders.
The United States, with its many thousands of miles of
shoreline and rivers, much of it densely populated and
heavily insured, is always at risk for enormous flood
losses."9 Various regions in the country are also subject
95. CNA, http://www.cna.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) (searching for
"climate change").
96. PROGRESSIVE, www.progressive.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
Progressive does reference climate change in describing a fuel-efficient
automobile initiative. PROGRESSIVE, http://search.progressive.comlsearch (last
visited Apr. 4, 2014) (searching climate change).
97. Eric Reguly, No Climate-change deniers to be found in the reinsurance
business, The Globe and Mail, November 28, 2013, available at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-magazine/an-
industry-that-has-woken-up-to-cimate-change-no-deniers-at-global-
resinsurance-giant/articlel5635331/?page=all. We have not researched
European insurers other than the three reinsurers and Zurich Insurance
Group.
98. Gen Re, a Berkshire Hathaway company based in Stamford,
Connecticut, has more information on climate change than most U.S. insurers,
but it is not as prominently available on its website compared to Swiss Re and
Munich Re. GEN RE, http://www.genre.com/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2014)
(searching "climate change").
99. G.A.O., National Disasters: Public Policy Options for Changing the
Federal Role in Natural Catastrophe Insurance, 9 (GAO-08-07, November
2007). Hurricanes Andrew (1992), Katrina (2005) and "Super Storm" Sandy
(2012) were the three largest natural disasters in the U.S. in terms of property
insurance payments -$24.3 Billion, $47.4 Billion, and $18.8 Billion
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to hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, hail, blizzards,
drought, heat waves, deep freezes, forest fires,
mudslides, and other weather-related losses that could
become both more common and more destructive.
Insurers are as much or more a stakeholder in efforts
to address climate change as any other industry.100
A more accurate explanation may be that major
property casualty insurers in the United States are not
ignoring climate change, but see little business
advantage in publicizing their views and work in the
field, as public acceptance to even the existence of
climate change remains controversial in the United
States. Informal discussions with State Farm
representatives suggest this idea, as they noted that
State Farm has been tracking weather patterns for 125
years as part of its risk modeling and continues to do so
today, regardless of how they publicly characterize the
reasons for changing weather patterns. This is a more
likely explanation than believing the country's largest
property casualty insurer is simply ignoring climate
change and the added risks it presents to the company
and its policyholders. 0 1 Whether it applies to other
insurers, especially those with a regional rather than
respectively. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Catastrophes: Insurance
Issues, http://www.iii.org/issues updates/catastrophes-insurance-issues.html
(last visited Apr. 4, 2014). These figures, adjusted for 2012 dollars, do not
include flood claims paid by the NFIP. Id. The 2011 World Trade Center
attacks accounted for approximately $24.35 Billion in property claims, and
additional insurance payments for life, health, liability and workers'
compensation claims. THE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, 140 (2014).
100. Recognizing this, the United Nations has a special initiative to recruit
insurers as allies in climate change adaption and mitigation. UNEP
PRINCIPLES FOR SUSTAINABLE INSURANCE, http://www.unepfi.org/psil (last
visited Apr. 4, 2014).
101 "Most insurers, including the reinsurance companies that
bear much of the ultimate risk in the industry, have little
time for the arguments heard in some right-wing circles that
climate change isn't happening, and are quite comfortable
with the scientific consensus that burning fossil fuels is
the main culprit of global warming." Eduardo Porter, For
Insurers, No Doubts on Climate Change, New York Times, May
14, 2013, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/business/insurers-stray-
from-the-conservative-line-on-climate-
change.html?pagewanted=all. Frank Nutter, longtime president
of the Reinsurance Association of America, was interviewed
in this article: "[i]nsurance is heavily dependent on
scientific thought . . . It is not as amenable to
politicized scientific thought . . .the insurance industry's
reluctance [to publicly address climate change] is born of
hesitation to become embroiled in controversies over energy
policy." Id.
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national focus, is uncertain.
Zurich's various websites strongly support this
thesis. Zurich Insurance Group is a Swiss-based
insurer with a large U.S. presence and is prominently
engaged in climate change research and advocacy. On
Zurich's home page (English version) it provides
extensive web-based information on climate change,
including its own "Climate Initiative," which studies
the effects of climate change on policyholders and
insurers.102 However, in contrast, there are no climate
change references found on the website of its U.S.
subsidiary, Farmers Insurance.103 Zurich made opposite
decisions on how to disclosure and promote its
involvement with climate change in Europe and the
United States - or at least related to their personal
lines products.104
Opinion polls in the United States have generally
demonstrated that compared to Eurpoeans, the
American public is more skeptical of both the existence
of climate change and the need to mitigate and prepare
for it. Acceptance of climate change by the American
public has varied from fifty-two percent to seventy-two
percent between 2008- 2012, as evaluated by the
Center for Local, State and Urban Policy at the
University of Michigan (Figure 6, infra).o5 Although
belief in climate change has increased to sixty-seven
percent from its low of fifty-two percent in spring 2010,
it has not yet climbed back to its high of 72% in fall
2008.
Figure 6: Belief in Global Warming
102. ZURICH FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, The Climate Risk Challenge: the
Role of Insurance in Pricing Climate-Related Risks (2009), available at
http://www.zurich.com/aboutus/resourcecenter/pdfdownloads/.
103. Since Farmers' website does not have a search function, all likely web-
based topic pages were reviewed, as was done for other insurer websites.
Farmers Insurance provides insurance primarily for individuals and small
businesses. FARMERS INSURANCE, www.farmers.com (last visited Apr. 4,
2014).
104. Zurich also does commercial insurance business under its own name in
the United States and a "climate change" website search on its North
American website pulls up the same documents as it does on Zurich's home
page. ZURICH, http://www.zurichna.com/zna/home/welcome.htm (last visited
Apr. 4, 2014).
105. FORD SCHOOL CENTER FOR LOCAL, STATE, AND URBAN POLICY,
http://closup.umich.edu/issues-in-energy-and-environmental-policy/2/nsee-
findings-report-for-belief-related-questions/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
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Yes 7 2 6571 52%' 58S 55,; MS 6 5%S 68 8 67's
No 17 20% 36% 26% 32% 26% 24% 21% 22%
Not Sure i1 15% 13% 16% 12% 12% 11% 11% 12%
This contrasts with polling results in the European
Union (EU). In 2011 an EU survey asked residents to
identify "the greatest problem facing the world."1os
Climate change was second out of eleven choices, with
20% of those surveyed ranked it the number one
problem.107 While this is a somewhat different question
than belief in climate change, it necessarily assumes a
high level of public acceptance. A similar poll in the
U.S. placed climate change as eleventh out of thirteen
issues upon which Congress and the President should
foCUS.108
The political sensitivity of the climate change
debate in the U.S. is also illustrated by how state
insurance regulators address the issue. The National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a
private organization composed of the insurance
regulators of all 50 States and 6 districts and
territories,109 has had a climate change and global
106. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Special Eurobarometer 372: Climate Change
Report, 5 (Oct. 2011), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/publicopinion/indexen.htm.
107. Id. "Poverty, hunger and lack of drinking water" was ranked the
greatest problem, followed by "climate change," "the economic situation," and
"international terrorism." Id.
108. YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION & GEORGE
MASON UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION, Public
Support for Climate and Energy Policies in November 2013, 8 (2013), available
at http://environment.yale.edu/climate-communication/article/public-support-
cimate-energy-policies-November-2013/. The survey stated, "Here are some
issues now being discussed in Washington D.C. Do you think each of these
issues should be a low, medium, high, or very high priority for the president
and Congress," where 14% of respondents said global warming should be a
very high priority" and 13% "high." Id.
109. See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States:
Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625 (1999) (describing that, while the
NAIC is a private entity without formal regulatory authority, given the
absence of any significant federal regulatory oversight of the insurance
industry, it has long served as the major national forum for insurance
regulatory issues). Its work includes developing model laws, regulations and
regulatory bulletins which states may then enact, along with issuing reports
and studies on insurance regulatory and industry issues. Id. Much of the
NAIC's substantive work is done through its numerous committees and
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warming working group since 2006.110 In 2009, the
NAIC approved a mandatory climate risk disclosure
survey that each state would administer, but faced
with strong opposition it reversed itself a year later and
made it voluntary. The NAIC further qualifies this
optional survey:
This survey, and the questions contained herein, do not endorse,
reject or otherwise express an opinion on the existence or absence of
climate change. Further, this survey, and the questions contained
herein, do not express an opinion regarding scientific confirmation
or refutation of the existence or absence of climate change."'
Fortunately, California, New York and
Washington, and recently Connecticut and Minnesota,
require insurers writing more than $100 million in
annual premium to complete the survey, effectively
capturing the national market.112
However, some organizations believe that insurers
in the United States are ill prepared and unwilling as
of yet to confront climate change threats. Ceres, the
private investor advocacy group that encourages and
promotes environmentalism in major public companies,
has issued several reports over the last four years
criticizing insurers for their lack of discussion on
climate change and lobbied the NAIC on this issue.
Ceres has characterized this silence or indifference as a
potential failure in corporate governance, given how
insurers are exposed to climate changes risks as
investors, employers and as risk underwriters. In 2011
working groups consisting of state insurance commissioners and their senior
staff, supported by NAIC personnel and its administrative and financial
resources. Id.
110. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, THE
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON INSURANCE REGULATION, 1
(2008), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/ciprpotential-impact-climate-change.pdf.
111. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, Insurer
Climate Risk Disclosure Survey, 1 (Mar. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees-explen-climate-survey-032810.pd
f.
112. For a succinct history of the NAIC climate disclosure survey, see
CERES, Insurer Climate Risk Disclosure Survey: 2012 findings &
Recommendations, 15-16 (March 2013), available at:
http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/naic-report/view. "Despite rising
concerns over the financial risks facing the insurance industry from climate
change, climate risk disclosure efforts at the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) have been almost as volatile as recent weather." Id. at
15. Insurer survey responses are public and available on the California
Department of Insurance website. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE,
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/releasel08-13.cfm
(last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
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Ceres commented, "y]et despite widespread recognition
of the effects climate change will likely have on
extreme events, few insurers were able to articulate a
coherent plan to manage the risks and opportunities
associated with climate change."113 Ceres found little
improvement by March 2013:
In general, almost all companies responding to the survey show
significant weakness in their preparedness to address the effects of
climate change may have on their business. However a small subset
of industry leaders are evolving their business strategies to remain
competitive as the impacts of climate change unfold.114
Our state-based insurance regulatory system
makes a national response to concerns raised by Ceres,
other organizations, or the states themselves, more
difficult to coordinate. For example, the NAIC, which
exists in part to promote regulatory consistency (and
expertise), could not achieve consensus on even a
climate change survey for insurers. State regulators
have concerns similar to industry about publicly
addressing climate change and they operate in a more
politically charged environment, regardless of whether
they are appointed or elected. However, our insurance
regulatory structure is probably a far less significant
impediment to developing a national strategy on
climate change than the lack of public acceptance,
multiplicity of building codes and land use laws, and
often uncoordinated, underfunded and inconsistent
federal responses. Further, the federal government
does not lack the authority to require regulatory action
or consistency in insurance, they simply do not use it
often.115
We do not have a national consensus on how to
recognize and spread the cost of catastrophic risks that
affect regions of the country unequally.116 And, while
insurance can be a powerful tool to allocate these risks
and provide private sector incentives encouraging
mitigation and adaptation to the effects of climate
change, utilizing it requires regulatory consent,
whether state, or federal, on how to do so. Allowing
113. Supra note 98, CERES, Climate Risk Disclosures by Insurers, (Sept.
2011), available at http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/insurance.
114. CERES, Insurer Climate Risk Disclosure Survey, p. 6 (March 2013),
available at http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/naic-report/view
115. See supra note 47. The NFIP is one notable exception, which may
prove the point about problems with federal responses to date.
116. CORNEL QUINTO, INSURANCE SYSTEMS IN TIMES OF CLIMATE
CHANGE: INSURANCE OF BUILDINGS AGAINST NATURAL HAZAZRDS,
74-75 (Springer, 2010).
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insurers to utilize fully risk-based pricing places much
of the risk of loss onto the property owner
(policyholder). Suppressing rates or developing
government-backed insurance pools spreads the risks
and costs to a larger base of policyholders and
taxpayers. This can alleviate some of the access and
affordability concerns, but also reduces the incentives
to build better or elsewhere.117
Often a "consensus" is implicit. For example, the
NFIP was not designed to assess through premiums
the full cost of flooding, which means claims would be
partially paid by taxpayers throughout the country,
regardless of their flood exposure.118 Similarly,
government assistance to rebuild properties after a
catastrophic event could certainly be an appropriate
public policy, but it can also reduce the incentives for
property owners to purchase insurance.
Recent amendments to the NFIP capture this
debate. In 2012 Congress passed the Biggert-Waters
Act, which would have largely eliminated these
subsidies, shifting the risk allocation more to the
individual policyholder and away from the country as a
whole.119 When the magnitude of the rate increases
became more widely known in 2013, a lengthy political
debate occurred, which was frequently captured on the
front pages of major newspapers. As a consequence, in
March 2014 Congress passed and the President signed
the Homeowners Flood Insurance Affordability Act of
2014.120 This Act postpones, revises or repeals the
various premium increases Biggert-Waters required
and as a result, our implicit system of national
subsidization of flood losses will continue.
IV. CONCLUSION
This is a pivotal time in the intersection of climate
policy, climate law, and insurance. The regulatory and
legal response to climate emissions is even more
channeled to the CAA. While climate science has a long
history, the real world impact and disruption of climate
117. And perhaps reduces the willingness of insurers to participate in the
market.
118. The NFIP is approximately $30 Billion, in debt, stemming from the
2005 hurricanes and Storm Sandy.
119. Supra note 68.
120. House Resolution 3370, enacted as Public Law No.113-89. Summaries
for this Act can be found through THOMAS, the Library of Congress' legislative
research engine, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php
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change is very much an evolving question. New
understandings of climate harm yield new challenges
for the insurance industry.
Insurers, at least publicly, are dealing with this
uncertain environment in a spectrum that runs from
direct engagement to, perhaps, complete avoidance.
However, avoidance or inaction for whatever reasons
could have dire consequences. Insurance is based on a
portfolio of risk assessment, pricing, spreading, and
when thought necessary, avoidance. Climate change
challenges these functions because the science is
uncertain, mitigation and adaptation responses often
largely outside insurer control, and regulatory
responses inconsistent - and without any immediate
promise of uniformity. Litigation risk, whether from
claims against policyholders or insurers directly (e.g.,
failure of corporate governance) adds additional
uncertainty. This can lead to less, rather than more,
insurer engagement with climate change, as a logical
reaction is to add exclusions and reduce exposure to
property losses and liability claims. But, reducing
insurance coverage would only shift the risks from
insurers to policyholders without any reduction in the
magnitude of risk, and lessens the ability to utilize
risk-based premiums as a tool to encourage mitigation
and adaptation.
For now, perhaps the best regulatory solution is to
follow the lead of the state regulators who are actively
engaged in climate change legislation and insist on
greater climate information, study, and portfolio risk
evaluation. Providing incentives or encouraging
insurers to engage in the climate change debate in the
United States could also contribute to greater
acceptance of the reality of climate change and enhance
the ability to develop and implement more effective
responses. 121
Traditional insurance functions - compensating for
losses and providing financial incentives for safety, risk
avoidance and mitigation - make it a valuable ally in
adapting to climate change, but only if it perceives the
possibility of profitably insuring the risks. The
legislative and regulatory challenge is to balance these
concerns with equally important questions of insurance
121. If deciding not to engage in climate change planning is considered a
corporate governance failure, there will also be financial penalties when this
inaction leads to corporate litigation against the insurer and its officers and
directors.
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access, affordability, and ultimately the development of
a public consensus of how risks should be socialized
throughout a state or the nation.
